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Paradox in Perspective: A Liar’s Guide to Humor 
 
Prof. Stephen Palmquist  
 
“But if I agree with you, we’ll both be wrong!” 
 
Why do we laugh at jokes? Numerous theorists have attempted to answer this question. 
Probably the most commonly-held answer is that laughter arises as a way of releasing a 
build-up of tension. For example, the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), claimed: 
“Laughter…arises if a tense expectation is transformed into nothing.”1 He thinks a 
well-formed joke causes the listener to expect one kind of outcome, but the punch line delivers 
a different result. The psychologist Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) defended a similar “relief” 
theory of humor: laughter releases the psychic energy built up by some unconscious tension.2 
Another philosopher, Henri Bergson, argued in his book, Laughter (1900), that humor is 
intrinsic to the human situation, but is normally valid only for a particular, socially-defined 
target audience; laughter arises when we abstract from the feeling-content of a situation, 
viewing it from a purely intellectual point of view. But does all humor fit these rules? 
 The one-line joke quoted above can serve as an example to illustrate the limits of such 
accounts of humor. Do you think the opening quote is funny? If so, why? Did it release a 
tension you were previously experiencing? I doubt it. Admittedly, Bergson is right most of the 
time: very few jokes can be translated literally into another language and still be funny. But 
some can. Why? 
 My theory of humor is not inconsistent with the foregoing accounts, but raises them to a 
new level of generalization. I maintain that humor arises first and foremost out of a momentary 
deception caused by an unexpected mixing of perspectives. (A “perspective” is a way of 
looking at a particular subject matter, or an “angle” from which to view something.) When a 
listener is led to believe that the speaker is assuming one perspective, but then a very different 
perspective suddenly comes into play, the result (for those who recognize the mixing of 
perspectives—i.e., who “get” the joke), is laughter. To claim to “agree” with one’s opponent 
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and yet to say we will then “both be wrong” is to deceive the other person into thinking you are 
agreeing, yet not to deceive them, since you are admitting all along that you will still disagree 
with the opponent’s position. This is paradoxical, so it is funny only for those who see the 
paradox. 
 Paradox is, in fact, one of the most interesting features of philosophy. Among the great 
paradoxes that have perplexed many a philosopher, perhaps the first and foremost is the 
so-called Liar Paradox. It originates from an ancient Greek poem by Epimenides, written to 
Zeus in c.600BC. In the poem Epimenides (a citizen of Crete) says: “They fashioned a tomb for 
thee, O holy and high one / The Cretans, always liars, evil beasts, idle bellies! / But thou art not 
dead: thou livest and abidest forever, / For in thee we live and move and have our being.” Two 
centuries later, the philosopher Eubulides of Miletus noticed that in this poem a Cretan is 
claiming that Cretans always lie; and if this is true, then Epimenides’ claim (that all Cretans lie) 
must itself be a lie! 
 The Liar Paradox has taken many different forms over the past 2500 years, such as “I 
always lie” or “This statement is false”; but in each case, a crucial feature of the Liar Paradox is 
that it must involve self-reference. There is no paradox if I say “You always lie”, nor is “This 
statement is false” a paradox if “this” refers to the previous sentence. In the latter case, it would 
merely be stating that you do not always lie, which is perfectly self-consistent. What I have 
discovered during my 25 years of teaching at HKBU is that students almost always laugh when 
I explain such self-referential paradoxes. Why is that? 
 If we treat the Liar Paradox (or any paradox arising out of the problem of self-reference) 
as a merely semantic phenomenon, then it is ultimately irresolvable. This is the way 
philosophers have most often treated it, so this is why such paradoxes still perplex people today. 
However, if we look more deeply at what makes such paradoxes (especially the Liar Paradox) 
funny, then we may at least be able to understand why they are paradoxical. This may not 
“resolve” the paradox, in the most technical sense of the term (i.e., the sentences will remain 
paradoxical); but it will make them much less confusing. 
 Before explaining how the above theory of humor (as a deceptive mixing of perspectives) 
can ease the perplexity of the Liar Paradox, I shall reflect briefly on the multi-perspectival 
character of human nature in general. Humans are rational animals, and all reasoning is rooted 
in the presupposition of what can be called a “double I”: the “I” who thinks and the “I” who is 
the object of thought (or who experiences or remembers oneself thinking). Without both senses 
of “I”, we could not reason. It is therefore no accident that the most difficult problem of 
self-reference is: “How can I know the knowing ‘I’?” 
 This problem is ultimately irresolvable if we limit our understanding of human reason to 
the traditional form of logic initially developed by the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle. He 
argues that all meaningful statements must abide by two main rules: the law of identity (A is A) 
and the law of non-contradiction (A is not -A). I call this “analytic logic”, because it teaches us 
how reason operates when we are dividing the world into discrete units of meaning. However, 
quite a lot of human language functions not to divide the world, but to enable us to put together 
what would otherwise remain separate. This use of language is also rational, yet it does not 
follow Aristotle’s laws. What I call “synthetic logic” (or the logic of paradox) assumes the 
opposite rules: the law of non-identity (A is not A) and the law of contradiction (A is -A).3 
 Another way to express the same distinction is to say that analytic (Aristotelian) logic 
enables us to understand purely verbal truth, whereas synthetic logic enables us to understand 
experienced truth. We misunderstand the point of Friedrich Nietzsche’s claim, that “everything 
is false” (a statement that becomes paradoxical, once we apply it to itself), if we think he was 
literally claiming that no words can express any consistent (analytic) truth. The profound 
wisdom of his statement can be grasped only if we assume he was using synthetic logic (i.e., 
intentionally contradicting himself) to point out that language falsifies experienced reality: 
words can never perfectly describe our experience. For those who refuse to accept the 
possibility that paradoxes can be meaningful, the only option is the one proposed by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.”4 The irony, of 
course, is that these words are themselves paradoxical, if they are taken as a rule that relates to 
unspeakable reality. As such, Wittgenstein’s profound maxim is actually quite funny. 
 Only if we recognize the function of synthetic logic (i.e., only if we are willing to consider 
that paradoxes can convey genuine meaning) can we understand why there is truth in every jest. 
Just as in the theory of humor introduced above, so also paradoxes can be explained quite easily, 
by identifying the two (or more) perspectives that are being deceptively mixed. In the case of 
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standard philosophical paradoxes such as the Liar, these two perspectives can best be identified 
as perspectives of “the one” (or universal truth) and “the many” (or particular truth). In the case 
of the Liar, for example, the perspective of the poet (the “thinking I”) as the “the observer of all 
Cretans” does not seem paradoxical at first; the paradox arises only when we view the poet 
from the perspective of the poem itself (the “thought I”), as “one of the Cretans”. We laugh at 
the thought that a Cretan is calling all Cretans liars; but we only get the joke if we see through 
the deception of the mixed perspectives. This conflation is what makes the statement a paradox. 
 Similar explanations can be given for each of the great paradoxes that have perplexed 
philosophers down through the years. In the paradox of the Heap (where piling up grains of 
sand at some point eventually become a heap, yet the exact point of transformation cannot be 
identified), for example, to name the heap is to think of it from the universal perspective (“all 
grains of sand in the pile”), while thinking of it as not yet a heap requires the perspective of the 
particulars (“each of the grains of sand”). 
 Not all paradoxes arise out of the conflation of universal and particular perspectives. 
However, all paradoxes are grounded in some conflation of perspectives, just as all humor is 
grounded in a thinly veiled attempt to deceive one’s listener into treating multiple perspectives 
as one. Some paradoxes, for example, conflate linguistic (or analytic) truth with experiential 
(or synthetic) truth. The Paradox of the Horns (e.g., the horse has never lost its horns, so why 
does the horse have no horns?) conflates the linguistic meaning of “not lost” (as equivalent to 
“still possesses”) with the empirical meaning (as equivalent to “does not possess”). Similarly, 
Zeno’s most famous paradox (i.e., the race between Achilles and the tortoise, whereby the 
fastest runner never catches the slowest animal, because he can only ever reach half the 
distance between them) conflates two perspectives on time: mathematical and experiential. 
 Does this awareness of perspectival differences actually resolve such time-honored 
paradoxes? Yes and no. The claim that paradox is a problem is the ultimate logical lie, for it 
deceives us into believing that human reasoning is mono-perspectival. And that is not funny! 
For that misconception about human reason is the root of all personal disagreements. 
If you disagree with me—especially if you believe that analytic logic is the only path to 
truth and meaning—I promise not to call you a liar, since you probably wouldn’t get the joke! 
